The Legal Duty Rule and Learning about Rules: A Case Study by Goldstein, Joel K.
Saint Louis University School of Law
Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship
2000
The Legal Duty Rule and Learning about Rules: A
Case Study
Joel K. Goldstein
Saint Louis University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Legal Education Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Goldstein, Joel K., THE LEGAL DUTY RULE AND LEARNING ABOUT RULES: A CASE STUDY (December 6, 2018). Saint
Louis University Law Journal, Vol. 44, No.1333, 2000. Reprinted with permission of the Saint Louis University Law Journal © 20__
and/or 19__,St. Louis University School of Law, St. Louis, Missouri.
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
1333 
THE LEGAL DUTY RULE AND LEARNING ABOUT RULES: A CASE 
STUDY 
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Early in their law school careers, most students find that the notions they 
brought with them about law clash with the ideas encountered there.  As a 
traditional first semester course, Contracts is one arena in which students 
experience most acutely that tension between expectation and reality. 
Most new law students probably expect law school professors to spend 
more time teaching basic legal rules.1  They anticipate the education in black 
letter law that is the distinctive trait of bar review courses.  They are, therefore, 
surprised by their professors’ suggestion, whether explicit or implicit, that 
being a good lawyer is not a function just of knowing the rules.2  Moreover, 
new law students expect legal rules to operate differently than they often do.  
Their initial perspective frequently places greater faith on simple rules than the 
curriculum ultimately suggests is appropriate.  They expect law to be more 
mechanical, to guide with the precision of rules of traffic—when the light turns 
red, you must stop—–or of rules of games—the tie goes to the runner, the line 
is in (or out as the case may be). 
 
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  I am grateful to Milton I. Goldstein 
for helpful comments, to Matthew Piant and Christopher Tracy for able research assistance and to 
Mary Dougherty for superb secretarial help.  I have been privileged to know two master teachers 
of Contracts whose example has inspired me.  I studied Contracts in law school under Professor 
Clark Byse.  He was a committed and caring teacher who communicated by his example his 
enthusiasm for the material and for law.  Years later, when I began teaching, he was always 
generous in responding to my occasional calls for his help.  Professor Vincent Immel has been 
my cherished colleague these past seven years.  His commitment to excellence in teaching, to his 
students, and to this law school have been evident in more than 40 years on our faculty.  They are 
magnificent models as Contracts teachers and colleagues in the profession and I am grateful for 
having had the opportunity to learn from both.  Neither they nor anyone other than myself is 
responsible for any shortcomings of this article. 
 1. STEWART MACAULEY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 1 (1995). 
 2. Clark Byse, Introductory Comments to the First-year Class in Contracts, 78 B.U. L. 
REV. 59, 65-66 (1998).  See also EDWARD J. MURPHY ET AL., STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW v (5th 
ed. 1997) (Study of law “involves not only familiarizing oneself with certain data, but reflecting 
upon that data in a way that helps to form a first-rate professional competence.”). 
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Clear and simple rules do have their place.  They govern more conduct in 
the real world than in the artificial confines of law school courses which focus 
on hard cases.  Still, students soon find that rules are far less precise and far 
less predictive than they anticipated.  Legal reasoning is more complicated 
than deciding to press the accelerator (or brake) or signal the runner safe (or 
out).  The student who simply knows what the rules are will not necessarily be 
a very adept (or happy) lawyer.  This helps explain, in part, why teaching basic 
doctrine is not the primary task law schools have assumed. 
This is not to say that rules are unimportant to law or to law schools.  On 
the contrary, they are central to both.  Viewing “[t]he rule of law as a law of 
rules”3 may be controversial, but there is no doubt that law and rules are 
intertwined and interdependent concepts.  Much of legal education involves 
exploring questions about rules, just not those questions students expect to 
dominate.  If law school does not primarily teach specific rules, it does focus 
on questions about rules.  What are rules?  How are they made?  By whom?  
Why?  What are the advantages and disadvantages of various types of rules?  
What characteristics should judge made rules have?  Why do rules change?  
And so on. 
A basic course in contracts offers many opportunities to explore these 
issues.  Yet, few topics lend themselves so easily, or so productively, to this 
enterprise as does the preexisting or legal duty rule.  It provides a case study 
through which students can discover central ideas about law that will reappear 
in other contexts.  Exposing some of these ideas in this context will enable 
students to identify and assess these phenomena when they arise elsewhere; in 
Contracts, in other courses or in situations they address during their 
professional careers. 
This essay will suggest some ways in which the legal duty rule can be used 
to educate students about rules.  It will first sketch the basics relating to the 
preexisting duty rule.  This outline will necessarily be incomplete, given the 
function of this project and the constraints imposed by the space allowed.  The 
purpose of this essay is not to explore fully the legal duty rule and the 
ramifications of its various circumventions, fictions and alternatives.  Others 
have done so quite well.4  Rather, the overview of that concept will service the 
 
 3. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
 4. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 182 (4th 
ed. 1998); ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 245 (1952); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS 287 (2d ed. 1990); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 245 (3d 
ed. 1990); Daniel A. Graham & Ellen R. Pierce, Contract Modification: An Economic Analysis of 
the Hold-Up Game, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989); Robert A. Hillman, Contract 
Modification in Iowa — Recker v. Gustafson and the Resurrection of the Preexisting Duty 
Doctrine, 65 IOWA L. REV. 343 (1980) (hereinafter Hillman, Contract Modification in Iowa); 
Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 
CORNELL L. REV. 680 (1982) (hereinafter Hillman, Contract Modification Under the 
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discussion in section three which will suggest ways in which the basics can be 
used to explore larger themes about rules and law. 
II. THE PREEXISTING DUTY RULE: A SKETCH 
A. The Rule and Its Rationale 
The legal duty rule provides that a promisee’s performance of an act she is 
already obligated to perform is not consideration for the promisor’s agreement 
to pay a different amount than originally agreed.  The issue arises in two 
classic paradigms.5 
Assume Art and Bart enter into a contract whereby Art will mow Bart’s 
lawn in exchange for $20.  Before performance, Art tells Bart he will not cut 
the grass unless he receives $25.  Bart agrees to pay the higher fee for the same 
service.  Once Art performs, however, Bart tenders a check for $20 instead of 
$25.  Art demands the larger amount.  Bart refuses.  Under the legal duty rule, 
Bart’s promise to pay $25 is not enforceable because it is not supported by 
consideration.  Art’s performance of something he was duty bound to do—
mow Bart’s lawn—is not consideration for Bart’s second promise. 
The issue also arises in a second context, when a promisor obligated to pay 
a sum agrees to pay a smaller amount to discharge its obligation.  Thus, 
Lorraine and Jane agree that Lorraine will mow Jane’s lawn for $25.  When 
Lorraine finishes, having well-performed the job, Jane agrees to pay Lorraine 
$20 if Lorraine accepts that amount as a complete satisfaction of Jane’s debt.  
Lorraine agrees, but after taking the $20 she decides she wants to recover the 
extra $5.  Lorraine claims the second agreement ($20 for a discharge) is 
unenforceable under the legal duty rule. 
Note that in each hypothetical, the legal duty rule makes the modified 
promise (to pay $25, to accept $20) unenforceable for lack of consideration 
without considering anything else.  It is irrelevant to the concept why the 
parties agreed to the modification, how they reached that agreement, what 
alternatives the promisor had, what relationship the parties had, or whether the 
revised price was fair for the work done. 
The rule, in both manifestations, is commonly traced to England in earlier 
times.6  For instance, in Harris v. Watson,7 an occasional casebook performer,8 
 
Restatement); Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the UCC: Good Faith 
and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849 (1979) (hereinafter Hillman, 
Policing Contract Modifications); Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of 
Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981); Subha Narasimhan, Modification: The Self-Help 
Specific Performance Remedy, 97 YALE L.J. 61 (1987). 
 5. See LON L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 124 (6th ed. 
1996). 
 6. Professor Arthur L. Corbin claimed not to “know the origin of this rule or the reasons 
that led courts to adopt it in the first place” and his modest disclaimer cautions me against 
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plaintiff, a seaman, sought to recover additional wages the ship’s master 
promised him while en route to Lisbon after the vessel allegedly encountered 
peril.  Lord Kenyon dismissed the case.  Such an action “would materially 
affect the navigation of this Kingdom.”9  If seamen could claim additional 
compensation upon encountering danger, “they would in many cases suffer a 
ship to sink, unless the captain would pay any extravagant demand they might 
think proper to make.”10 
Eighteen years later, maritime matters11 provided a second illustration in 
Stilk v. Myrick.12  Seamen agreed to sail round trip from London to the Baltic 
for five pounds per month.  While en route, two seamen deserted and the 
master agreed to pay the others the deserters’ wages.  They worked the vessel 
home, only to receive the sum originally agreed to without any portion of the 
promised increment.  The court limited the seamen to the original amount.  
Lord Ellenborough thought Harris rightly decided but on different grounds.  
The crew was duty-bound to exert itself to respond to any emergency.  They 
gave no new consideration for the promised additional wage.  Accordingly, the 
master’s promise failed for want of consideration.13 
The second manifestation—payment of part of a debt cannot discharge the 
entire amount—also runs its roots deep in history.  In Pinnel’s Case, the court, 
in dictum, pronounced “that payment of a lesser sum on the [due date] in 
satisfaction of a greater, cannot be any satisfaction for the whole.”14  Several 
centuries later, that conclusion emerged as the rule of Foakes v. Beer.15  
Plaintiff Julia Beer obtained a judgment of £2090 from Dr. Foakes which, by 
law, carried interest.  Beer agreed to accept installment payments of the 
principal alone; upon receiving that amount, she demanded the interest.  No 
consideration supported her agreement to forgive the interest, Ms. Beer argued, 
since Dr. Foakes, in paying the principal, simply did (less than) what he was 
obligated to do.  Dr. Foakes argued through his advocate, W. H. Holl, that the 
House of Lords should enforce the discharge: A creditor may benefit from 
 
drawing definite conclusions on these points based upon the secondary literature consulted.  
CORBIN, supra note 4, at 246. 
 7. 170 Eng. Rep. 94 (1791). 
 8. See, e.g., THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS AND 
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 199 (3rd ed. 1999); JAMES F. HOGG & CARTER G. BISHOP, 
CONTRACTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 198 (1997). 
 9. 170 Eng. Rep. at 94. 
 10. Id. 
 11. For a discussion of the role of maritime cases in the law school curriculum, see Joel K. 
Goldstein, Reconceptualizing Admiralty: A Pedagogical Approach, 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 625 
(1998). 
 12. 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (1809). 
 13. For a critique, see GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 22-28 (1974). 
 14. 77 Eng. Rep. 237, 237 (1602). 
 15. 9 App. Cas. 605 (House of Lords 1884). 
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prompt part payment rather than litigating the claim or forcing the debtor to 
bankruptcy.  The Lords thanked Mr. Holl for his sterling presentation and 
showered him with compliments, which no doubt would have made his parents 
proud.  To his client’s chagrin, it then applied the doctrine from Pinnel’s Case 
which, though criticized, “has been accepted as part of the law of England for 
280 years.”16 
This sketch of these classics reveals three rationales which have supported 
the legal duty rule.  In Harris, the court made clear that “public policy” 
considerations justified the rule against one-sided modifications.  Although the 
court used only the amorphous label, its discussion made clear that it feared 
extortion would result if the law enforced unreciprocated contractual revisions.  
Extortion, of course, subverts values intrinsic to contract law.  Coerced 
promises are not, by definition, freely given and are accordingly, at war with 
the classic model of autonomous, rational parties entering into contract.17  
Moreover, extortion undermines the institution of contracts and threatens to 
misallocate resources.  Judge Richard Posner writes: 
It undermines the institution of contract to allow a contract party to use the 
threat of breach to get the contract modified in his favor not because anything 
has happened to require modification in the mutual interest of the parties but 
simply because the other party, unless he knuckles under to the threat, will 
incur costs for which he will have no adequate legal remedy.  If contractual 
protections are illusory, people will be reluctant to make contracts.  Allowing 
[extorted] contract modifications to be voided . . . assures prospective contract 
parties that signing a contract is not stepping into a trap, and by thus 
encouraging people to make contracts promotes the efficient allocation of 
resources.18 
Lord Kenyon’s cryptic justification in Harris did not persuade all.  When 
Stilk arose, Judge Posner had not yet appeared to illuminate these issues for 
Lord Ellenborough.  Stilk accordingly rested on a different premise.  Lord 
Ellenborough found the vessel owner’s promise of additional pay failed 
because the seaman gave no new consideration.  The court need not look at 
public policy arguments for the absence of the formality of consideration made 
the promise unenforceable.19 
 
 16. Id. at 612. 
 17. See, e.g., Graham & Pierce, supra note 4; Hillman, Contract Modification Under the 
Restatement, supra note 4, at 680-81. 
 18. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 19. Professor Eisenberg suggested that consideration has often served as a surrogate for 
inquiry into fairness issues since courts long believed they lacked power to engage in fairness 
review.  See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 
646-47 (1982). 
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Finally, the preexisting duty rule has rested on earlier precedent.20  Foakes 
invoked not only Pinnel’s Case but also Harris and Stilk.  By design, precedent 
has a snowballing effect.  Doctrine grows as later decisions surround earlier 
ones in rolling through history.  The rule, accordingly, grew as later cases 
relied on the older ones. 
Subsequent cases that applied the legal duty rule have invoked one or more 
of those justifications.21  Precedent, for instance, became an argument not 
simply to apply the preexisting duty rule in the familiar context of two party 
modification cases.  It became a basis to extend the rule to other situations 
involving parties already bound to perform some duty.  Thus, public officials 
and even some private employees whose employment imposed a duty to the 
public later were deemed ineligible to claim a reward offered to anyone who 
did what the officials were already bound to do.22 
The rule was also applied in a three-party context.  In McDevitt v. Stokes,23 
one Shaw hired Mike McDevitt to ride his mare, Grace, in the celebrated 
Kentucky Futurity race.  Stokes, a horse breeder, owned two of Grace’s 
brothers; their value would rise and he would benefit if Grace won.  He offered 
McDevitt $1000 if McDevitt rode Grace to victory.  McDevitt, and especially 
Grace, performed.  Grace crossed the finish line first but Stokes paid only $200 
of the promised amount.  McDevitt sued for the balance.  Stokes claimed that 
his promise was unsupported by consideration since McDevitt was already 
bound (to Shaw) to ride the horse to victory.  Of course, if Shaw, not Stokes, 
had made the second promise, the modification would clearly run afoul of the 
rule.  Seeing no difference in the three-party context, the court sustained 
Stokes’ position and held his promise to McDevitt unenforceable.24 
The other two bases, consideration and extortion prevention, are central 
concepts in contracts law.  Consideration responds largely to the perceived 
need for formalities to achieve important evidentiary, cautionary and 
channeling functions of contract law.25 
Extortion prevention helps assure that contracts are entered into freely.  
Contracts encourage long-term commitments.  Knowing the law will enforce 
certain promises enables entrepreneurs and consumers to plan their futures 
with greater certainty, thereby enhancing their utility.  But, as Judge Posner 
 
 20. See, e.g., Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co., 15 S.W. 844 (Mo. 1890). 
 21. See, e.g., Recker v. Gustafson, 279 N.W.2d 744, 795 (Iowa 1979) (price increase invalid 
for want of consideration). 
 22. See, e.g., Denney v. Rappert, 432 S.W.2d 647, 649 (1968) (policemen and bank guards 
ineligible for reward since acting in course of public/private duties); Gray v. Martino, 103 A. 24, 
24 (N.J. 1918) (police officer ineligible for reward); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 73 cmt. b (1981). 
 23. 192 S.W. 681 (Ky. 1917). 
 24. See id. at 683. 
 25. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799-800 (1941). 
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points out, “[t]here is often an interval in the life of a contract during which 
one party is at the mercy of the other.”26  An unscrupulous or greedy contractor 
may exploit this dependence by demanding a higher price or offering a reduced 
performance.  The imperfection of legal remedies—they are costly and do not 
reach all damages—may leave the demandee without effective recourse.  The 
legal duty rule protected prospective victims by holding one-sided 
modifications unenforceable, theoretically removing the incentive to exploit 
dependency. 
The competing rationales are reflected in the different way many 
casebooks present the legal duty concept.  Many casebook authors, following 
from Stilk, present the doctrine as part of a chapter on consideration.27  Others, 
taking their lead from Harris, present the doctrine as one designed to police 
contractual behavior.  For instance, Summers and Hillman regard the rule as 
“principally a policing doctrine” and present it in their chapter, Policing 
Agreements and Promises.28  Knapp, Crystal and Prince confine their 
discussion of the rule to their materials on modification in the Justification for 
Nonperformance chapter.29  Some introduce the concept with consideration 
and return to it in discussing policing techniques.30  Dawson, Harvey and 
Henderson offer some small taste of the rule in their material on exchange 
through bargain and reliance on a promise but offer their full sampling of it in 
their chapter, Policing the Bargain.31  Kasteley, Post and Hom provide a “first 
look” at the preexisting duty rule in their unit on consideration but provide a 
 
 26. United States v. Stump Home Specialties Mfg., Inc., 905 F.2d 1117, 1121 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
 27. See, e.g., MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 250-53; JOHN D. CALAMARI ET AL., 
CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 186-229 (3d ed. 2000) (containing a section on duress 
followed by a section on statutory changes regarding the modification of contracts.); ROBERT W. 
HAMILTON ET AL., CONTRACTS CASES AND MATERIALS 278-313 (2d ed. 1992); FULLER & 
EISENBERG, supra note 5, at 114-37; RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 
703-16 (1995); ARTHUR ROSETT & DAVID J. BUSSEL, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATIONS 
471-512 (6th ed. 1999). 
 28. ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: 
THEORY, DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE (3rd ed. 1997).  Summers and Hillman do include a short 
note in their materials on consideration of teaching the doctrine as an exception to the bargain 
theory.  Id. at 80. 
 29. CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
798-809 (2d ed. 1999).  See also E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 287 (5th ed. 1995) (policing the bargain). 
 30. See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENTS 221-25, 289-
91, 560-97 (7th ed. 1998). 
 31. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1340 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1333 
more thorough discussion in a later unit, Agreed Modifications and the Pre-
existing Duty Rule.32 
B. The Rule and Its Demise 
By design, the preexisting duty rule operated in a relatively simple, 
straightforward fashion.  Any one-sided or unreciprocated modification was 
unenforceable.  A court faced with such a modification need not ask any 
questions or consider many facts.  The parties’ conduct, motives, or 
alternatives were irrelevant as was the fairness of the modification.  One fate 
fit all. 
The simplicity of the rule came at a price.  Over time, the rule proved 
vulnerable to criticism by courts and commentators alike.  Professor Patterson 
thought of the legal duty rule as an “adjunct of the doctrine of consideration 
which has done most to give [consideration] a bad reputation.”33  One court 
called it “one of the relics of antique law which should have been discarded 
long ago.”34  The literature overflows with caustic comments denigrating the 
doctrine.  Its underlying rationale (enforce consideration, prevent extortion) 
seemed too feeble to support it.  Take consideration as a justification.  It was 
not clear that one-sided modifications really offended either the benefit-
detriment or bargain theory of consideration.  Some cases did argue that the 
promisor received no benefit and the promisee incurred no detriment when the 
promisee agreed simply to fulfill a duty.35  Yet these arguments tended to rely 
on rather wooden definitions of benefit and detriment.  As Professor 
Farnsworth observes, “it requires no great stretch of the imagination to view 
performance by a promisee that is reluctant to perform both as a benefit to the 
promisor, which has reason to want a bird in the hand, and as a detriment to the 
promisee, which might prefer to take its chances on being sued for damages.”36 
Although some view the preexisting duty rule as “a logical extension of the 
bargain theory,”37 that conclusion is certainly contestable.38  “To one schooled 
 
 32. AMY H. KASTELEY ET AL., CONTRACTING LAW 323-29, 923-40 (1996).  See also 
MURPHY ET AL., supra note 2, at 103-17, 792-802 (introducing topic in chapter on consideration, 
returning to it in chapter on good faith). 
 33. Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 936 
(1958).  But see Samuel Williston, Successive Promises of the Same Performance, 8 HARV. L. 
REV. 27, 36 (1894) (praising rule as logical and just). 
 34. Rye v. Phillips, 282 N.W. 459, 460 (1938). 
 35. See, e.g., Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co., 15 S.W. 844, 848 (Mo. 1891) 
(“What benefit was to accrue to Wainwright? . . . What loss, trouble, or inconvenience could 
result to Jungenfeld that he had not already assumed?”). 
 36. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at 287.  Professor Farnsworth points out that the argument 
that any detriment is not a “legal” detriment is circular and question begging.  See also CORBIN, 
supra note 4, at 247-48. 
 37. BARNETT, supra note 27, at 703. 
 38. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at 287. 
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in the contemporary bargain theory of consideration, it might seem just as 
logical to conclude that performance, even by one who is already under a duty 
to perform, is consideration for a promise if the performance is bargained 
for,”39 Professor Farnsworth points out.  The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts recognizes this point in section 72 which provides in part that “any 
performance which is bargained for is consideration” except for performance 
subject to the legal duty rule.40  The logic of the bargain theory of 
consideration does not therefore compel the preexisting duty rule.  On the 
contrary, only by defining the bargain theory to exclude promises to perform 
enforceable duties is the preexisting duty rule preserved. 
The weakness of the consideration rationale was revealed by the tendency 
of those invoking it to slide quickly, and often without transition, into the 
extortion argument.  In Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery Co.,41 a casebook 
favorite,42 the Supreme Court of Missouri strenuously, but conclusorily, argued 
absence of consideration and then, without changing course asserted the “plain 
fact that Jungenfeld took advantage of Wainwright’s necessities, and extorted 
the promise . . . .”43  To permit recovery would “offer a premium upon bad 
faith.”44  This argument might present a convincing reason not to enforce the 
modification, but extortion prevention, not the sanctity of consideration, 
propelled the discussion. 
But extortion prevention itself increasingly came to be seen as an imperfect 
rationale for the preexisting duty rule.  The fit between the rule and that 
objective was far from perfect.  To be sure, some one-sided modifications 
might reflect extortion.  In Alaska Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico,45 the owner of 
a salmon fishing boat agreed to double the crew’s pay to induce it not to jump 
ship at a time when it was too late to engage replacements.  Based on the 
court’s findings that showed no motive other than opportunism to explain the 
sailors’ conduct, the court found the owner’s promise of double wages 
unenforceable under the preexisting duty rule.46  The sailors effectively said, 
“Stick ‘em up!” and the owner did.  Of course, when the owner obtained the 
voyage’s catch, it promptly put down its hands and cut the checks for the 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72 (1981).  See also CORBIN, supra note 4, § 
171. 
 41. 15 S.W. 844 (Mo. 1891). 
 42. See, e.g., CRANDALL & WHALEY, supra note 8, at 200; FULLER & EISENBERG, supra 
note 5, at 117; HOGG & BISHOP, supra note 8, at 199-201; FREDRICH KESSLER ET AL., 
CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 652-55 (3d ed. 1986); DAVID H. VERNON, CONTRACTS: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 160-62 (2d ed. 1991). 
 43. Lingenfelder, 15 S.W. at 848. 
 44. Id. 
 45. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). 
 46. Id. at 102. 
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original amount,47 an action which resulted in the case coming to court and 
ultimately to generations of law students. 
But all one-sided modifications do not evidence such opportunistic 
behavior.  In some respects, the rule proved overinclusive; in addition to 
combatting holdups it also arrested some innocent, even beneficial behavior.  
Although it is easy to appreciate that one-sided modifications might reflect 
extortion and produce unconscionable results, empirical evidence does not 
necessarily support this intuition.48  Some one-sided modifications might be 
good faith adjustments by rational entrepreneurs fully possessed of their senses 
and their free will.  The parties might agree that one would pay more owing to 
some changed circumstance that complicated performance.49  For instance, a 
homeowner or buyer might agree to pay the contractor more than the contract 
requires when the latter encounters unanticipated rubble or soil conditions,50 or 
when the number of customers a contractor is to serve increases 
exponentially.51  Enforcing the promise may actually increase the promisor’s 
utility.  Assume a home buyer promises to pay the builder more than the 
contract price after the builder hits hard rock or soggy soil that makes the 
contract price unfeasible for it.  “If the purchaser merely declares his intention 
of paying the builder a higher price, but is free to renege, [because of the 
preexisting duty rule] the builder may decide not to complete performance but 
instead to take his chances in bankruptcy court,”52 Judge Posner explains.  The 
buyer may prefer to promise, rather than to pay up front, for fear that if the 
contractor goes belly up the buyer may have trouble recovering his cash.  “This 
is a clear case where the enforcement of a promise not supported by fresh 
consideration enhances the welfare of the promisor,”53 Judge Posner argues. 
A businessperson might agree to accept less (or pay more) for the same 
performance in order to preserve a needed supplier, help a loyal customer, 
develop a reputation for fairness, or avert an interruption of performance.  For 
instance, in Goebel v. Linn defendant beer brewers agreed to pay an ice 
company $3.50/ton although their contract called for a price of $2/ton.  A very 
 
 47. See, e.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 65 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing the case). 
 48. Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 645; Hillman, Contract Modification Under the 
Restatement, supra note 4, at 682-84, 689. 
 49. Indeed, in Alaska Packers, the fishermen argued unsuccessfully that the nets provided to 
them were deficient.  117 F. at 101.  Since their pay was based in part on the size of the catch, 
they argued they should receive more to compensate for the bad equipment.  Id. 
 50. See also Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 411 (1977); see, e.g., Watkins & Son, Inc. v. Carrig, 21 A.2d 591 (N.H. 1941). 
 51. See, e.g., Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630 (R.I. 1974) (enforcing price increase after units 
to be serviced by refuge collection increase twenty times faster than anticipated). 
 52. Posner, supra note 50, at 421. 
 53. Id. 
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mild winter had produced an inadequate crop of ice.54  The brewers, not 
wishing their product to go bad, agreed to the higher charge.55  But once the ice 
was delivered and preserved the brew, defendant’s commitment to the increase 
chilled and it stood on the original contract.56  The court upheld the 
modification and ruled for plaintiff.57  Defendant had thought the price 
increase preferable to jeopardizing their supplier’s business and their own 
under the extraordinary circumstances they faced.58  They were bound by the 
modification. 
The preexisting duty rule would render each such modification 
unenforceable.  The doctrine did not discriminate between coerced and 
voluntary modifications.  Uncoerced modifications were rendered 
unenforceable even when they seemed intuitively appropriate. The courts’ 
refusal to enforce them frustrated the expectation of contractors who had 
arranged modifications.59 
The rule also proved underinclusive in that it failed to address some 
coerced contractual behavior.  An extortionist who demanded a greatly 
increased compensation could shield his misconduct by conferring some token 
concession on his victim.  Thus, the rule would not prevent the fishermen in 
Alaska Packers from extorting their double wage, provided they threw some 
(fish) bone their employer’s way.  Similarly, the preexisting duty rule only 
addressed a certain type of coerced contractual behavior, unperformed 
unilateral promised modifications.  Once the promise was performed, the rule 
no longer provided any remedy.  The rule, after all, served simply to rule 
certain conduct unenforceable since not supported by consideration.  Yet 
performance rendered the presence or absence of consideration a moot point.  
Thus, the rule made the Alaska Packers’ promise to pay double wages 
unenforceable but would not apply if the owner had already distributed the 
raises. 
Dissatisfaction with harsh applications of the rule led courts to search for 
ways to avoid applying it.  Courts have viewed facts imaginatively to avoid the 
rule.60  In addition, they searched for fictions to circumvent the rule.61  First, 
contract law recognized as enforceable mutual modifications.  Although a one-
 
 54. Goebel v. Linn, 11 N.W. 284, 284 (Mich. 1882). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 285. 
 58. Id. at 286. 
 59. FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, at 290. 
 60. See, e.g., De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807, 808 (1917). 
 61. MURRAY, supra note 4, at 247-48; Hillman, Contract Modification Under the 
Restatement, supra note 4, at 685-86.  Other techniques include finding consideration in the 
promise not to breach or in unanticipated circumstances.  See, e.g., King v. Duluth, Missabe & 
Northern Ry. Co., 63 N.W. 1105 (Minn. 1895); Linz v. Schuck, 67 A. 286, 289 (Md. 1907). 
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sided modification, i.e., Bart’s promise to pay $25 instead of $20, is 
unenforceable for want of consideration, a bilateral modification may bind 
both.  This circumvention hardly reflects novel thinking.  On the contrary, it 
follows from Lord Coke’s dictum nearly four centuries ago to the effect that 
some corresponding change such as a “horse, hawk or robe” would suffice to 
make the modification enforceable.62  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
specifically provides that “a similar performance [to that previously owed] is 
consideration if it differs from what was required by the duty in a way which 
reflects more than a pretense of bargain.”63  Courts have sometimes winked at 
the “more than a pretense” concept and accepted something less.  “Yet any 
consideration for the new undertaking, however insignificant, satisfies this 
rule,” observed the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Levine v. Blumenthal64 
(noting that payment at a different time or place or “in property, regardless of 
its value” could suffice).65  Thus, if Art agrees to render the service a day (or 
hour) earlier or to run the sprinkler after he cuts Bart’s lawn, Bart’s previously 
unenforceable new promise blossoms (hopefully like Bart’s lawn) into a 
commitment the law will enforce.  This new consideration renders the legal 
duty rule irrelevant even though Bart’s new promise may be coerced. 
In addition to the mutual modification technique, the legal duty rule can be 
avoided by mutual rescission.  Under this technique, the parties do not simply 
modify their original agreement in a single step.  Instead, they accomplish the 
same effect but in two steps.  First, each surrenders their rights against the 
other under the original contract in a contract to rescind.  Having eliminated 
their respective rights against, and duties to, each other, they proceed, in step 
two, to fashion a new contract.  As Professor Murray points out, such an 
arrangement involves three contracts—the initial executory contract, the 
contract of rescission, and the new contract.66 
Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc.,67 a casebook favorite,68 illustrates 
the rescission two-step.  Schwartzreich was contractually obligated to design 
clothes for Bauman-Basch for $90 per week for one year beginning in 
November 1917.  The prior month, Schwartzreich advised his employer of an 
 
 62. Pinnel’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 237, 237 (1602). 
 63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981). 
 64. 186 A. 457, 459 (N.J. 1936). 
 65. Id. 
 66. MURRAY, supra note 4, at 255. 
 67. 131 N.E. 887 (N.Y. 1921). 
 68. See, e.g., CALAMARI ET AL., supra note 27, at 186-90; MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET AL. 
CONTRACTS: CONTEMPORARY CASES, COMMENTS AND PROBLEMS 185-86 (1992); DAWSON ET 
AL., supra note 30, at 564; FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 5, at 129; KESSLER ET AL., supra 
note 42, at 79-83; MATTHEW MCKINNON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 7-26 - 7-30 
(1993); ROSETT & BUSSEL, supra note 27, at 472-78; SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 28, at 
632-36; VERNON, supra note 42, at 163-67. 
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offer from another firm at $110 (or $115 depending on whom you believe) per 
week.  Bauman-Basch agreed to pay, and Schwartzreich to accept, $100 per 
week and the parties executed a new agreement to that effect.  The 
arrangement lasted a month at which point Schwartzreich was fired.  In his 
action to recover for damages based upon the $100/week price, the legal duty 
rule would jump out at many compulsive classroom volunteers as an obstacle 
to recovery.  Not a problem, reasoned the great New York Court of Appeals of 
the Cardozo period, in an opinion written by Justice Crane.  At the same time 
the parties executed the new $100/week contract, Schwartzreich left with his 
employer the old $90/week deal with the signatures torn off.  “There is no 
reason that we can see why the parties to a contract may not come together and 
agree to cancel and rescind an existing contract, making a new one in its 
place,”69 wrote Justice Crane, a conclusion which not only “[a]ll concede” but 
which, better yet, was supported by Professor Williston on Contracts.70  It was 
immaterial whether the two steps, rescission and recontracting, took place 
sequentially or simultaneously, a position which has vigorous modern critics.71 
To be sure, the two circumventions rested on a certain logic of their own.  
Contract law would derive little benefit from holding parties to a contract 
neither wanted.  Clearly the law had to allow parties an escape from such a 
deal. If both parties wanted to cash in their chips before the game played to 
completion why not let them?  Of course, once they had eliminated any 
contractual commitments to each other under Contract I by Contract II, the 
legal duty rule would not inhibit them from creating new relations between 
themselves (Contract III).  Nor would contract law have any apparent interest 
in preventing a subsequent transaction between the parties that they freely 
decided would advance their respective interests. 
Mutual modification rested on similar logic.  If instead of terminating their 
agreement, both parties simply wanted to change it, why not let them do so?  If 
two parties wanted to modify their original agreement by each undertaking an 
additional burden or disadvantage to receive some perceived gain, why should 
they not be able to do so?  Bart’s delighted to pay the extra $5 to have his yard 
watered as well as mowed; Art’s thrilled to become $5 richer simply for 
turning on the sprinkler.  Contract law generally assumes that each party 
knows her own interests.  It refuses to assign values to items to be exchanged 
so long as consideration seems to exist.  It would be anomalous for contract 
law to impose a more stringent test for modifications. 
Yet recognition of these circumventions also made the legal duty rule less 
compelling.  Schwartzreich’s new deal became enforceable simply because of 
 
 69. See Schwartzreich, 131 N.E. at 890. 
 70. Id. 
 71. MURRAY, supra note 4, at 255. 
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the simultaneous rescission of the old deal.72  Absent that step, presumably the 
court would have invoked the legal duty rule and disallowed the unilateral 
change.  Yet whether Schwartzreich and his boss simply insert and initial  
“$100/week” over “$90/week” in Contract I or shred the first contract and 
execute a new one, the substance of the deal is the same.  It would seem to 
exalt form over substance, to turn enforceability on whether the parties insert 
and initial or shred and reexecute. 
Mutual modification posed other problems.  Consistent with the general 
approach to consideration, the law does not scrutinize deeply the relative 
values of the modifications so long as at least one favors each party.  As Judge 
Posner put it, “The law does not require that consideration be adequate—that it 
be commensurate with what the party accepting it is giving up.  Slight 
consideration, therefore, will suffice to make a contract or a contract 
modification enforceable.”73 Thus Bart’s willing, yet unreciprocated, promise 
to pay an extra $5 is unenforceable yet it becomes binding once Art makes 
some trivial concession like working in the morning instead of the afternoon, 
accepting a check instead of cash, or running the sprinkler while he packs up to 
leave.  “To surrender one’s contractual rights in exchange for a peppercorn is 
not functionally different from surrendering them for nothing,”74 Judge Posner 
concludes. The shrewd extortionist would come within the mutual 
modification exception and accordingly not offend the rule. 
The willingness of courts to enforce these circumventions reflected 
misgivings regarding the rule.  Courts could accept a simultaneous rescission 
because it allowed them to dance around the preexisting duty rule and enforce 
the agreed upon modification.75 
The law compromised the legal duty rule to accommodate other values.  
Assume George asserts an invalid claim against Abraham for $1,000.  
Abraham wishes to settle the matter by paying $250 in exchange for a release.  
Can George enforce Abe’s promise to pay $250?  A strict application of the 
legal duty rule might frustrate the settlement.  Since George’s claim is invalid, 
he is relinquishing nothing in exchange for the money.  But such a resolution 
would impede settlement of disputes, an activity society prefers to encourage.  
Determining whether a discharge would support a return promise would 
require the parties to litigate the underlying claim to test its validity.  But that 
would defeat the parties’ desire to avoid the risks and expenses of litigation.  
Moreover, parties wish to settle invalid as well as meritorious claims to 
provide certainty and security.  The law has limited the legal duty rule by 
 
 72. Schwartzreich, 131 N.E. at 890. 
 73. United States v. Stump Home Specialties Mfg., Inc., 905 F.2d 1117, 1122 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 4, at 269. 
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allowing some surrender of invalid claims or defenses to be consideration for a 
return promise.  Although the formulations vary,76 Restatement § 74 requires 
only that the surrendered claim or defense have some foundation or rest on a 
good faith belief.  Restatement § 74 provides: 
Settlement of Claims 
(1) Forbearance to assert or the surrender of a claim or defense which 
proves to be invalid is not consideration unless 
(a) the claim or defense is in fact doubtful because of uncertainty as to 
the facts or the law, or 
(b) the forbearing or surrendering party believes that the claim or 
defense may be fairly determined to be valid.77 
The good faith requirement makes enforceability turn on the subjective belief 
of the party asserting the claim or defense.  This test blows a wide hole through 
the preexisting duty rule in the context of settlements since it may shield a 
“negligent or foolish” belief.78 
The preexisting duty rule did not operate alone in the field.  The doctrine 
of duress as it had evolved by the dawn of the twentieth century might also 
provide relief.  The excuse of duress allowed a victim to void a contract if his 
manifestation of assent was induced by an “improper threat” that left the 
victim with “no reasonable alternative.”79  Duress was not, of course, a 
doctrine of recent vintage.  For centuries, the common law doctrine addressed 
property transfers compelled by some criminal or tortious threat of physical 
violence.  The relatively novel feature was, however, the expansion of the 
doctrine to address economic pressure.80  Thus, the realm of improper threats 
was expanded to include those that breached “the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing under a contract with the recipient” of the threat.81  This category 
included within its possible reach some contract modifications.82 
The doctrine of economic duress offered an alternative weapon against 
extorted modifications.  This development did not calm misgivings about the 
 
 76. See, e.g., Duncan v. Black, 324 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (surrendered 
claim or defense must have some foundation and rest on good faith). 
 77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 74(1) (1981). 
 78. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement, supra note 4, at 691. 
 79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981). 
 80. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176, cmt. a (1981) (“Modern 
decisions have recognized as improper a much broader range of threats, notably those to cause 
economic harm.”); CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 4, at 187 (duress doctrine evolving to 
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N.E.2d 533, 536 (N.Y. 1971). 
 81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(1)(d) (1981). 
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preexisting duty rule; if anything it may have had the opposite effect by 
presenting an alternative weapon against extorted modifications.  The 
preexisting duty rule came under heavy assault from a range of courts, learned 
commentators and legislatures.  “There has been a growing doubt as to the 
soundness of this doctrine as a matter of social policy,”83 reported Professor 
Corbin at the middle of the twentieth century. 
The criticisms of the preexisting duty rule took their toll.  Over time, 
contract law softened the preexisting duty rule in several noticeable ways.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts specifically endorsed some one-sided 
contract modifications.  Restatement § 89 provides in pertinent part: 
A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on 
either side is binding 
(a)   if the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances 
not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made; or 
(b)  to the extent provided by statute; or 
(c)   to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of material 
change of position in reliance on the promise.84 
Restatement § 89 did not, of course, bury the preexisting duty rule.  That 
doctrine remained in Restatement § 73.  By its terms, Restatement § 89 
addressed only a subset of those situations the old rule covered.  In effect, 
Professor Robert A. Hillman has argued, Restatement § 73 viewed unilateral 
modifications as presumptively coerced subject to rebuttal under the terms of 
Restatement § 89.85  But Restatement § 89 did turn more than a few shovels in 
the emerging hole.  It did not mention consideration86 nor did it require that 
modifications be reciprocal. The doctrine was presented in a section entitled 
“Contracts Without Consideration.” It specifically rejected the mutual 
rescission two-step, which was firmly lodged in consideration theory as often 
“fictitious” and unproductive.87 
The primary criteria it substituted required simply that the modification (a) 
be “fair and equitable” and (b) rest on circumstances the parties did not 
anticipate at the time of contracting.88  These characteristics were seen as 
 
 83. CORBIN, supra note 4, at 246.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89, 
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 85. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement, supra note 4, at 686-87. 
 86. Some cases purporting to follow it did, however, find consideration in the changed 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Brian Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Brighenti, 405 A.2d 72, 76 (Conn. 1978). 
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rebutting any inference that a modification was procured through unfair 
pressure.  But the mere absence of coercion was not sufficient to render a 
modification enforceable.  The promisee also had to defend the modification as 
“fair and equitable,” a standard that suggested, in part at least, that the new 
terms should not reflect avarice or overreaching.  Indeed, the “fair and 
equitable” criteria may operate as something of a surrogate for voluntariness.  
Presumably, extortionists will drive a hard “bargain” and will not let their 
victims off with a fair and equitable result.  In addition, the promisee was 
required to demonstrate some “objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a 
modification.”  But the Restatement left some play in this limitation since an 
event may be unanticipated if not adequately covered even though foreseen as 
a remote possibility.89 
Cases have applied Restatement § 89 to enforce modifications in price in 
situations where substantial rubble which the parties had not anticipated vastly 
inflated the price of excavation90 or where some additional compensation was 
authorized to a refuse collector after the number of dwellings covered 
increased by twenty times the amount predicted91 or even when terms of the 
sale of a farm were adjusted in favor of the buyer after land values 
plummeted.92  An advocate might, with a straight face, classify these events as 
surprises.  But the justifying event apparently need not present such a shock.  
The Restatement also includes an illustration based on the precise facts of 
Schwartzreich.  If an employee receiving a better offer is an unanticipated 
circumstance, many events might qualify.  Restatement § 89(a) sanctions 
modifications in situations where the “unanticipated circumstance would not 
excuse performance”93 or even catch the parties off guard.  The potential of 
Restatement § 89 to subvert the rule of Harris, Stilk and Foakes is 
considerable. 
Still, Restatement § 89(a) may not bless all modifications.  The 
Schwartzreich illustration aside, its language appears to require that some 
“unanticipated circumstance” trigger the change.  But regardless of how 
broadly that ambiguous term is reasonably defined, it will not embrace all 
voluntary modifications.  As Professor Hillman points out, a range of 
considerations might induce contractors to agree happily to one-sided changes 
independent of any unforeseen circumstance.94 
Restatement § 89 also extended to situations in which a promisee’s 
reliance on a modification might make enforcement appropriate and to the 
 
 89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89, cmt. b (1981). 
 90. See Brighenti, 405 A.2d at 76. 
 91. Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 637 (R.I. 1974). 
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 93. See Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement, supra note 4, at 697-98. 
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extent statutes so provide.  The latter idea, that a statute might abrogate this 
common law doctrine, was hardly novel.  Presumably, its main significance 
was to incorporate in the sale of goods context the more sweeping innovation 
of the Uniform Commercial Code.  U.C.C. § 2-209 specifically provides that 
with respect to sales of goods an “agreement modifying a contract . . . needs no 
consideration to be binding.”95  In case anyone reading the statutory text 
missed its import, the Official Comment states its purpose to “protect . . . all 
necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the 
technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments,”96 and that “an 
agreement modifying a sales contract needs no consideration to be binding.”97  
If anything, U.C.C. § 2-209 is even more explicit than Restatement § 89 in its 
rejection of consideration doctrine and goes further in interring the preexisting 
duty rule.  The only limitation it recognizes is the requirement that a 
modification be made in good faith which “may in some situations require an 
objectively demonstrable reason.”98 
The U.C.C. is not oblivious to the policies behind the legal duty rule but 
seeks to achieve them in other ways.  The requirement that modifications 
within the Statute of Frauds must satisfy its terms serves the evidentiary and 
cautionary purposes of consideration.99  Modifications must also satisfy the 
U.C.C.’s good faith standard.  The U.C.C. so provides in Comment 2 to section 
2-209 and in section 1-203 which imposes a good faith obligation in the 
performance or enforcement of contracts for the sale of goods.  This approach 
has proved controversial.  Professor Hillman, for instance, argues that the 
absence of language in section 2-209 itself has led courts to overlook the good 
faith requirement and/or to develop the doctrine inadequately.100  Moreover, 
“[f]ew standards exist to tell us how hard one may twist the arm of the other 
before crossing the line into the zone of bad faith.”101 
III. LESSONS ABOUT RULES 
The contracts curriculum develops these various doctrinal strands in part to 
acquaint students with an area of law they may encounter down the road.  But 
providing this snapshot of the messy state of this corner of contract law 
provides only a part of the justification.  The path of the preexisting duty rule 
also provides an interesting case study from which we can uncover lessons 
about rules which can lead to a deeper understanding of law.  What follows are 
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suggestions regarding some of the points about rules we can extract from 
digging into this area. 
A. The Purpose of Rules 
First, rules are designed to serve purposes.  Hopefully my more charitable 
readers will suppress the sarcastic chorus of “duh” this rather obvious point 
may elicit. Justice Holmes reminded us of the importance of “education in the 
obvious”102 and I think this somewhat transparent point qualifies.  Rules rarely 
reflect simply some arbitrary choice.  They rather are fashioned with some 
goal(s) in mind.  In order to assess the merit of a rule of law, we must begin by 
trying to understand its animating purpose. 
At times, a rule may owe its creation to some substantive or instrumental 
end the law-maker seeks.  For instance, Lord Kenyon thought the preexisting 
duty rule necessary to prevent seamen on the Alexander from insisting on 
additional compensation in time of danger as their price for not suffering the 
vessel to sink.  The rule has often been justified as a way to prevent extortion, 
to remove the incentive a contracting party would otherwise have to use the 
other’s dependence to squeeze further concessions.  Rules also may have 
formal or procedural purposes.  Thus the preexisting duty rule might be 
justified as a way to give meaning to the doctrine of consideration when parties 
seek to modify a contract.  This was, of course, Lord Ellenborough’s point in 
explaining the outcome of Stilk. 
This discussion suggests a second basic attribute of rules—they may have 
multiple purposes or rationales.  This point, too, is hardly shocking; at some 
level we understand that behavior often has multiple explanations.  
Nonetheless as we identify one rationale that seems to have explanative power 
we often overlook other purposes that appeal to others. 
Sometimes the diverse justifications will each resonate with a particular 
audience.  Each point reinforces the other, leaving advocates of a rule doubly 
convinced of its merit.  On other occasions, however, the existence of multiple 
arguments may allow some who are skeptical regarding one rationale to 
support the rule based on the second.  If we believe the commercials, some 
appreciate Miller Lite because it  “tastes great,” others because it is “less 
filling.”  No matter how loudly they insist on their rationale during their 
barroom exchanges, the two camps may never convince each other.  Still both 
apparently have a reason to appreciate and consume the product.  Similarly, 
Lords Kenyon and Ellenborough can find merit in the rule because it satisfies 
the rationale important to them (“Prevents extortion!” “Protects 
consideration!”).  Both articulate the rule although they reach no consensus on 
its basis. 
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But just as multiple rationales may enhance the support a rule or product 
enjoys, it also may subvert its appeal.  Whatever makes beer taste good may 
also make it more filling and whatever makes it less filling may make it taste 
worse.  To the extent the preexisting duty rule makes concessions to 
consideration doctrine it may erode its ability to police extortion.  For instance, 
mutual modification and the mutual rescission two-step are rooted in 
consideration doctrine.  They may, however, undermine the rule’s ability to 
police extortion since they may camouflage coerced modifications.  The focus 
on whether modifications are reciprocal which consideration mandates diverts 
attention from whether they are voluntary. 
The legal duty rule demonstrates the effort of the law to craft rules which 
accommodate different objectives society values.  “Finding the proper balance 
between protecting flexibility and ensuring stability in contractual 
arrangements is the challenge of contractual modification law,”103 writes 
Professor Hillman.  For instance, the legal duty rule emphasized the formal 
requirement of consideration and sought to prevent extortion while paying 
little attention to the virtue of facilitating modifications.  The various 
alternatives and qualifications of that rule—Restatement §§ 74 and 89 and 
U.C.C. § 2-209—reflect different accommodations.  Restatement § 74, for 
instance, goes far to promote dispute settlement.  It subordinates consideration 
to that objective since it allows a party to trade an invalid claim for value 
provided it honestly believes in that claim. Restatement § 89 tilts the balance in 
favor of flexibility and away from stability, at least where its conditions are 
met.  Section 2-209 goes further, allowing modifications subject to the 
requirement of good faith.  Based on the lessons experience offers, the law 
changes the mix of ingredients to produce a rule which reflects contemporary 
dispositions. 
B. The Death of the Legal Duty Rule 
1. How Rules Erode 
The experience of the legal duty rule offers lessons regarding the demise of 
particular rules of law.  Several issues afford fruitful grounds for inquiry.  
First, what signs are there that a rule of law is undergoing stress, that society is 
less committed to a rule that once commanded obedience?  The experience of 
the legal duty rule suggests some tell tale signs that a rule is on a downward 
spiral. 
First, when courts frequently invoke fictions to avoid applying a rule it is 
reasonable to infer that the rule is losing its hold.  Judges tend to respect 
precedent and are understandably reluctant to announce that they have 
 
 103. See Hillman, Contract Modifications in Iowa, supra note 4, at 343. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] THE LEGAL DUTY RULE AND LEARNING ABOUT RULES 1353 
disregarded a rule of long-standing in order to reach a result it will not allow.  
Yet at times precedent may lead in directions judges believe are unreasonable 
or unjust.  Faced with such a predicament, some courts employ some fiction to 
reach a palatable outcome without demonstrating overt disrespect for a rule.  
Courts have often performed intellectual gymnastics to escape the consequence 
of the legal duty rule.  For instance, courts have allowed the mutual rescission 
two-step in cases where the two steps occur simultaneously.104  They have 
found consideration for a modification in dubious circumstances.105  Cases that 
use such ingenuity to avoid a rule suggest courts are not enamored with the 
rule.106 
Second, frequent criticism of a rule may suggest an erosion of its 
following.  Academic studies may reveal problems but ultimately judicial 
criticism is particularly significant.  Unlike academics, judges are not 
professional critics of rules.  Their job is to apply law to disputes, not to trash 
the rules they are supposed to apply.  When they include passages in their 
opinions explaining a rule’s shortcomings they often are campaigning for some 
change in it.  The judiciary has not been mute regarding its misgivings 
regarding the legal duty rule. 
Third, when exceptions to a rule proliferate it generally suggests some 
instability in the rule itself.  The mutual rescission two-step and mutual 
modification exceptions have been discussed above.  Restatement § 89 is even 
more subversive of the rule.  It rejects any pretense that consideration or some 
semblance of it is necessary to circumvent the rule.  Moreover, it adopts other 
criteria to exempt from the rule certain modifications. 
Finally, the development of alternative rules generally suggests a rule is on 
the skids. The adoption of U.C.C. § 2-209 endorsing modification without 
consideration suggests not only substantial dissatisfaction with the rule but 
offers a robust competitor in some contexts. 
Professor Corbin recognized a number of these factors.  Writing in 1952, 
he advised against according the legal duty rule much deference.  “When 
general rules have never been applied with uniformity and appear to be 
breaking down into a number of other rules that take new factors into 
consideration, it behooves both writers and courts to weigh the matter anew 
and to be ready to reach new results.”107 
 
 104. See Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, 131 N.E. 887, 889-90 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1921). 
 105. See Swartz v. Lieberman, 80 N.E.2d 5, 6 (Mass. 1948) (finding consideration where 
party, who has breached contract, agreed to perform for more money). 
 106. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 4, at 184  (“[T]here are many decisions in which 
ingenuity has been employed in circumventing the rule, often on tenuous grounds.  These 
decisions show that the courts are not impressed with the fairness of the rule.”). 
 107. CORBIN, supra note 4, at 246. 
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2. Why Rules Erode 
In addition to the descriptive issue of how rules erode, a second question 
relates to why they erode.  First, rules may erode because their underlying 
rationales become less convincing.  We have seen that consideration provides 
an important part of the foundation for the legal duty rule.  Yet consideration 
itself has experienced some loss of support. Contract law recognizes other 
bases for enforcing promises such as promissory estoppel (Restatement § 90) 
and promises for benefit received (Restatement § 86).  It also identifies 
situations in which consideration is not a sufficient basis.  As this foundation 
for the preexisting duty rule weakens a bit, so, too, must the rule. 
Second, rules crumble because the fit between rationale and result seems 
less perfect than society wants.  We have seen that one instrumental purpose of 
the legal duty rule was to prevent extortion.  That rationale is intuitively 
compelling and lies at the core of the concept of freedom of contract.  One 
party to a contract should not be able to extract more simply because the other 
has no adequate legal remedy which might embolden him to resist.  If the legal 
duty rule well-served that purpose it would be unassailable.  Over time, 
however, many have concluded that the rule is a poor instrument to ferret out 
extortion.  It results in some voluntary modifications becoming unenforceable 
yet does not censure some extorted modifications that have been completed or 
seem supported by a peppercorn in exchange.  In order to avoid discordant 
results, courts develop exceptions and escapes from the rule.  These may make 
the remaining core of the rule more palatable but ultimately the circumventions 
may subvert the rule.  If they proliferate, they suggest the rule may have less 
merit than thought.  They also deprive the rule of the certainty that was one of 
its virtues.  As Professor Macauley and his colleagues observe, “the pre-
existing duty rule is shot through with exceptions and qualifications.  It is 
difficult to say when it will and will not apply.”108 
Third, rules erode because over time the law develops other instruments to 
achieve their underlying rationale.  Contract law has certainly not abandoned 
the idea that law should not enforce extorted promises.  Far from it. Yet the 
preexisting duty rule has become less important as a mechanism to address 
extortion due in part to the expansion of duress as an alternative policing 
doctrine.  As duress has grown to incorporate economic duress, it reached 
many, if not all, of the situations of extorted contract modifications which the 
legal duty rule traditionally combatted.  Yet duress has clear advantages over 
the legal duty rule as a defense against extorted modifications.  It has a built-in 
filter which separates the extorted modifications from those freely given.  
Unlike the legal duty rule, it is not overinclusive.  Moreover, it can combat 
some extorted modifications which flew below the radar of the legal duty rule.  
 
 108. MACAULEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 252. 
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Unlike the legal duty rule, it does not give an automatic pass to the mutual 
modification, the mutual rescission two-step, or the completed exchange.  
Rules, like equipment, become obsolete not only because they no longer 
function well but also because a better model is available.  Even some who 
might conclude that the legal duty rule does a pretty good job, might consider 
it expendable given the new, improved duress model. 
C. Advantages of Different Types of Rules 
The subject of the legal duty rule also provides an opportunity to consider 
the relative merits of the different types of rules law students and lawyers 
encounter.  Some rules are relatively precise and turn on behavior easily 
measured against some yardstick.  When these rules turn on a single factor, 
they yield what might be called precise or bright-line rules.  Other rules may 
employ multi-factored tests and/or may utilize criteria that do not lend 
themselves to easy measurement.109  Bright-line and multi-factored rules have 
different advantages and disadvantages which can be explored in a discussion 
of the legal duty rule. 
With respect to the enforceability of contract modifications, the Contracts 
curriculum offers three contemporary alternatives—the preexisting duty rule 
which renders modifications unenforceable unless balanced by consideration, 
Restatement § 89 which makes modifications enforceable if fair and equitable 
and precipitated by unanticipated circumstances, and U.C.C. § 2-209 which 
makes modifications enforceable.110  In one sense the legal duty rule and 
section 2-209 seem polar opposites; one (section 2-209) makes enforceable 
what the other renders unenforceable.  They actually share an important 
feature.  Both are relatively bright-line rules which dictate the fate of 
modifications unsupported by consideration in simple, straightforward fashion.  
The legal duty rule requires decision-makers to address only one question of 
fact—whether consideration exists for the modification.  Section 2-209 
eliminates even that inquiry.  Thus both rules, to the extent applied, impose 
relatively simple tasks on the court and provide contractors with a relatively 
clear guide. 
 
 109. The “precise” and “multi-factor” terminology comes from Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).  At times, 
rules are juxtaposed with balancing tests but this dichotomy does not really capture the different 
nuances.  A balancing test is really a type of rule.  It identifies criteria which contractors 
must/may consider and courts must/may follow.  It involves two or more factors that courts must 
weigh.  At times, of course, the things the court is to balance will not be subject to measurement 
on the same scale.  At other times, they may conflict.  Ultimately, a balancing test gives the court 
more apparent discretion to resolve a case.  They point less directly to the answer and are more 
malleable.  Still, a court, which is supposed to weigh multiple considerations but decides based on 
only one factor, may be deemed to have misapplied the law. 
 110. I am putting aside, for now, the good faith inquiry the U.C.C. requires. 
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By contrast, Restatement § 89 requires the court to engage in much more 
fact intensive inquiries laden with subjective and malleable criteria.  The 
modification is enforceable only if fair and equitable, surely criteria that turn 
on numerous facts and circumstances and may differ to each beholder.  
Moreover, the fair and equitable modification must come from unanticipated 
circumstances, an inquiry that requires assessments of causation and 
foreseeability.  Under this standard, courts possess far more leeway to reach a 
result than they do under either of the other two rules. 
On its face, Restatement § 89 does a better job at separating extorted (and 
therefore unenforceable) promises from voluntary (enforceable) ones.  
Whereas section 2-209 would enforce all one-sided modifications and the legal 
duty rule would enforce none, Restatement § 89 would enforce only those that 
satisfied its two-factored test.  Restatement § 89 has considerable appeal if we 
believe that test does a good job at ferreting out coerced modifications.  A 
multi-factor rule will often seem more capable of achieving a particular 
purpose because it is designed more precisely to address the targeted evil. 
Multi-factor, imprecise rules impose some costs which study of 
Restatement § 89 reveals.  In particular, they require additional work from 
courts who must engage in more extensive fact finding to reach a conclusion.  
Parties presumably will often present conflicting accounts of what transpired.  
The testimony of the promisor will suggest the promise was coerced; the 
promisee will present the pledge as freely given.  Courts are not perfect and 
they will sometimes make mistakes.  The more factors that are relevant, the 
more occasion to find fact erroneously.  Finally, the imprecision of the rule 
may encourage those with marginal claims to litigate.  Multi-factor rules, like 
Restatement § 89, provide less predictability.  As bright-line rules section 2-
209 and the legal duty rule impose a lesser burden on courts and allow surer 
predictions than does Restatement § 89. 
The legal duty rule and duress lend themselves to a similar comparative 
analysis.  Both address extortion, the former by resort to a bright-line rule, the 
latter through a multi-factor approach.  The legal duty rule is a blunt 
instrument which addresses extortion by striking down all one-sided 
modifications. It is easy to apply and should deter those aware of it from one-
sided modifications (though not necessarily from extortion).  On the other 
hand, duress requires proof that (a) an improper threat, (b) induced a 
manifestation of assent and (c) the victim lacked a reasonable alternative.  The 
defense only upsets a modification if all three conditions exist—the threat was 
improper, it caused the modification, and the victim lacked reasonable 
alternatives.  This test addresses extortion precisely but imposes greater 
transaction costs and offers less predictable outcomes since it is a multi-factor 
approach which requires subjective and objective assessments of fact. 
The story of the preexisting duty rule cautions, however, that bright-line 
rules may not produce the level of certainty anticipated.  If such precise rules 
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detect their intended object, here extortion, with twenty-twenty vision, they 
may operate well.  But their aim is not perfect.  Like the preexisting duty rule, 
they overinclude and underinclude.  As a rule’s poor marksmanship becomes 
apparent, courts try to compensate.  They craft exceptions or fictions or engage 
in creative factfinding.  These expedients may help decide particular cases in 
more palatable fashion but they render the bright-line rule less bright than 
advertised.  Instead of having just the precise rule to guide them, courts and 
contracting parties now have a rule blurred by assorted exceptions and 
circumventions, a confusing chart of precedents pointing in different 
directions, a culture of judicial decisions somersaulting to avoid harsh or 
unpleasing applications. 
Moreover, defective rules typically impose an additional cost which the 
judicial conduct just described illustrates.  These ingenious solutions may 
produce the “right” result in a particular case but they tend to spawn incoherent 
doctrine.111  To the extent results seem manipulated, judicial integrity becomes 
subject to question.  Respect for the law and the judicial system suffer.  Candor 
has its advantages.  “It would have been preferable if these courts had simply 
found the modifying promise enforceable without consideration,” argues 
Professor Murray.112 
Multiple rules may apply to the same situation.  Under the U.C.C., for 
instance, section 2-209 purports to make a modification enforceable without 
regard to consideration.  Yet this bright-line rule does not really operate alone.  
It is subject to the ambiguous113 good faith requirements of the Code.  Thus, 
the modification is enforceable provided it is made in good faith.  Similarly, 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes an otherwise enforceable 
modification subject to duress analysis.  Thus, even simple bright-line rules 
often are reinforced by other rules.  The certainty a precise rule may seem to 
provide may be impaired once some issue like good faith or duress enters the 
calculus. 
Finally, study of the legal duty rule and its surrounding exceptions reveals 
another problem with rules that emphasize legal formalities.  Whether a 
modification is enforceable may turn on whether the parties are aware of the 
mutual modification or mutual rescission techniques.  In essence, those who 
are sophisticated regarding the formal requisites or who have access to legal 
advice may construct their modifications in a manner that renders them 
enforceable.  Those less informed or less affluent may run afoul of these 
 
 111. See, e.g., Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications, supra note 4, at 853-54. 
 112. MURRAY, supra note 4, at 254. 
 113. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications, supra note 4, at 858-59. 
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rules.114  In this respect, the legal duty rule may impact a person’s ability to 
achieve their reasonable expectations based on knowledge of formalities.  No 
doubt this form of discrimination occurs routinely and is, to some extent, 
inevitable.  But if the formalities are of dubious value or are esoteric, the price 
may be too high.  Why should two episodes of similar behavior which is 
equally voluntary (or involuntary) fare differently because one actor knew the 
formalities while the other did not? 
D. Precedent as a Guide 
The legal duty rule provides an opportunity to consider stare decisis as a 
basis for applying a common law rule.  To be sure, precedent has its claims and 
law students learn of the judicial tendency to apply rules of earlier cases to 
decide later controversies.  To some extent, the legal duty rule continues to be 
applied because of its status as precedent.  Foakes relied on that rationale.  
“The rule has been so long embedded in the common law and decisions of the 
highest courts of the various states that nothing but the most cogent reasons 
ought to shake it,” wrote the Missouri Supreme Court in Lingenfelder.115  The 
claims of precedent are stronger where an old rule brings certainty or has 
engendered reliance. 
Yet to what extent ought precedent to furnish a guide?  Lingenfelder 
recognized that “cogent reasons” could override common law precedent.  
Precedent might be disregarded, Professor Llewellyn suggests, where the 
underlying rationale of a rule fails to apply to a situation.  He wrote: 
They should come to recognize the court’s steady quest for rules which satisfy 
the needs of the Grand Tradition—each rule with a singing reason apparent on 
its face, each rule a rule whose reason guides and often even controls 
application according to the double maxim: the rule follows where its reason 
leads; where the reason stops, there stops the rule.116 
Thus, some courts abandoned the preexisting duty rule in the three-party 
context117 where the prevent extortion purpose of the rule was less compelling. 
Professor Corbin suggests a different reason for ignoring the rule.  “Like 
other legal rules, this rule is in process of growth and change, the process being 
 
 114. See, e.g., MACAULEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 251 (“[M]ost non-lawyers would not know 
about the consideration rule and think themselves bound to the settlement.”); Duncan Kennedy, 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1699 (1976). 
 115. Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewery, 15 S.W. 844, 848 (Mo. 1891). 
 116. K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 189 (Oceana 
Publications, Inc. 1996) (1960). 
 117. See, e.g., Patterson v. Katt, 791 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). 
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more active here than in most instances.”118  Why follow a common rule that is 
collapsing or is out of step with modern principles?119 
E. Statutory Sources of Common Law Development 
The case of the legal duty rule also provides an example of the extent to 
which statutory developments can shape the common law.  U.C.C. § 2-209 has 
not only abandoned the legal duty rule in the sale of goods context; it has also 
provided an analogy which has no doubt contributed to the erosion of the 
common law rule.  The common law grows not only as judges reason from and 
analyze other cases; it also borrows principles from statutes to evolve.120 
F. The Diverse Influences on Rules 
The legal duty rule also provides an opportunity to demonstrate the diverse 
intellectual currents which shape law and rules.  Professor Clark Byse observes 
that various approaches to the law each offer some insight.121  Thus, the 
positivist might appreciate the way the legal duty rule utters a simple 
command.  The legal realist might nod knowingly at the way judges 
manipulated the rule and its exceptions, in cases like Schwartzreich or 
DeCicco, to avoid harsh results.  The product of the legal process school might 
applaud the emphasis on identifying purposes behind rules.  The law and 
economics scholars might point to the way enforcement of a one-sided 
modification can maximize utility in circumstances where the party seeking the 
modification is responding to some changed circumstances, not exploiting a 
monopoly.122  The critical theorist might point out the extent to which the 
preexisting duty rule impacts differently the legally sophisticated and the 
legally illiterate.  These points are not exhaustive.  They illustrate the extent to 
which different perspectives may shine light in evaluating the rule. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The preexisting duty rule offers an opportunity to use one body of 
contracts doctrine to suggest more general ideas about law.  The avenues 
suggested above are by no means exclusive.  Others no doubt will effectively 
exploit the topic to other ends.  In any event, the enterprise is worth pursuing.  
 
 118. CORBIN, supra note 4, at 246. 
 119. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150-52 (Yale 
Univ. Press 1932) (1921). 
 120. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385-86 
(1908); James Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934); 
Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533, 
538-39 (1947). 
 121. Clark Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1063, 1091 (1986). 
 122. See generally Posner, supra note 50, at 421-24. 
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For ultimately the fascination in any subject of law is not simply in learning its 
doctrine but in probing what lies behind it, in exploring its connections to other 
areas of law, and in asking what lessons it teaches about law in general. 
 
